in Code, Fails

Matthew Green Explains the Juniper Backdoor

I hadn’t heard of the ScreenOS backdoor vulnerabilites, which are CVE-2015-7755 and CVE-2015-7756, until last night when I ran into some tweets about Matthew Green’s exposition on what they are and why they are so crazy:

To sum up, some hacker or group of hackers noticed an existing backdoor in the Juniper software, which may have been intentional or unintentional — you be the judge! They then piggybacked on top of it to build a backdoor of their own, something they were able to do because all of the hard work had already been done for them. The end result was a period in which someone — maybe a foreign government — was able to decrypt Juniper traffic in the U.S. and around the world.

And all because Juniper had already paved the road.

Some of his tweets on the situation explain it in even better terms IMO:

And—back to the article—on why this is important to talk about:

For the past several months I’ve been running around with various groups of technologists, doing everything I can to convince important people that the sky is falling. Or rather, that the sky will fall if they act on some of the very bad, terrible ideas that are currently bouncing around Washington — namely, that our encryption systems should come equipped with “backdoors” intended to allow law enforcement and national security agencies to access our communications.

One of the most serious concerns we raise during these meetings is the possibility that encryption backdoors could be subverted. Specifically, that a backdoor intended for law enforcement could somehow become a backdoor for people who we don’t trust to read our messages. Normally when we talk about this, we’re concerned about failures in storage of things like escrow keys. What this Juniper vulnerability illustrates is that the danger is much broader and more serious than that.

At this point, there’s no two bones about it. We need to be using encryption everywhere. And the encryption we use needs to be open source.

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